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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the scope, methods, the effects of  international 
coordination  of  economic policies.  In addressing the scope for and of 
coordination, the analysis covers the rationale for coordination,  barriers 
to coordination,  the range and specificity of  policies to be coordinated, 
the frequency  of coordination, and the size of the coordinating group.  Turning 
to the methods of  coordination,  the emphasis is on the broad  issues of rules 
versus discretion, single-indicator versus multi-indicator  approaches,  and 
hegemonic  versus more symmetric systems. 
In an attempt to shed some light on the effects of  alternative  rule- 
based proposals  for coordination, we present some simulations  of a  global 
macroeconomic  model  (MULTIMQD) developed  in the International Monetary  Fund. 
The simulations  considered  range from  'smoothing  rules for monetary and 
fiscal  policy that imply only  minimal international  coordination, to more 
activist  "target—zone" proposals that  place greater restrictions on national 
authorities  in the conduct of  monetary  and/or fiscal policies.  The simulation 
results are compared to the actual evolution  of the world economy over  the 
1974—87 period.  Our findings suggest that simple mechanistic  rule—based 
proposals are unlikely to lead to improved performance. 
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"Coordnaton  of macroeconomic  policies  is certainly  not easy; 
maybe it is impossible.  But in its absence,  I suspect 
nationalistic  solutions  will be sought——trade  barriers,  capital 
controls,  and dual exchange—rate  systems.  War among nations 
with these weapons is likely to be mutually  destructive. 
Eventually,  they,  too, would evoke  agitation  for international 
coordinarion. 
James  Tobin G987),  p.68 
I believe that  many of the claimed  advantages  of cooperation 
and coordination  are wrong, that  there are substantial  risks 
and disadvantages  to the types of coordination  that are 
enviaioned,  and that an emphasis  on international  coordination 
can distract  attention  from the necessary  changes in domeatic 
policy.' 
Martin  Feldatein (1988),  p.3 
This paper discusses the scope,  methoda,  and effects of international 
coordination  of economic  policies.  Coordination  is defined  here,  follow- 
ing Wallich  (1984,  p.85), as "..  . a significant  modification  of national 
pnlicies  in recognition  of international  econonic interdependence.  The 
existence  of a  number of comprehensive  surveys  of the literature  on 
coordination  makes  the task easier.  2/  This discussion  can,  therefore, 
be selective  and focus  on a number  of key issues  that  impinge on the 
advisability  and practicality  of atrengthening  policy  coordination 
among  the  larger industrial  countries.  The  purpose  ia  to  identify  and 
evaluate  factors  that merit attention  in any serious  examination  of the 
aub)  ect. —2— 
The paper is orgsnized  as follows.  Section  1 covers economic 
policy  coordination  in the widest  sense and addresses  various dimensions 
of the scope  for and of coordination.  The terrain  covered  inclodes 
the applicability  of the "invisible  hand"  paradigm  to decentralized 
economic  policy  decisions,  bsrriers to coordination,  the range  and 
specificity  of policies  to be coordinated,  the frequency  of coordination, 
and  the  number  of participants to  be included in the coordination 
exercise.  Section II  narrows  the discussion  to  monetary and fiscal 
policies  and turns  to  the methods of coordination.  The  emphasis here 
is  on  the broad  issues of rules  versus discretion, single—indicator 
versus multiple—indicator  approaches,  and  hegemonic  versus  more 
symmetric systems. 
Section  III is still  more specific  and confronts  the problem  of 
how to infer the effects  of coordination.  In an attempt  to shed some 
light on how the world economy might  be affected  by different  rule— 
based proposals  for coordination,  some aimulationa  are  presented  of a 
global  macroeconomic  model (MULTIMOD)  developed  in the International 
Monetary  Fund.  The simulationa  considered  range  from "amoothing"  rules 
for monetary  and fiscal  policy  that imply  only  minimum international 
coordination,  to more  activist 'target—zone  proposals  that  plate 
greater restrictions  on national authorities  in the conduct  of monetary 
and/or fiscal polities.  The  results of the simulations are  compared 
to  the  actual  evolution of  the  world economy over the  1974—87  period. —3— 
I  Scope for and of Coordination 
The most logical  atarting  point  ia to ask why international  policy 
coordination  would  be beneficial  in the first  place.  After all,  if in 
the  domestic economy,  the working  of  the invisible  hand  under  pure 
competition  translates  independent  decentralized  decisions  into a 
social optimum  why should  not  the same principle  apply to policy 
decisions  by  countries in the world economy? 
The  answer  is that  economic  policy actions,  particularly those of 
larger  countries,  create quantitatively significant spillover  effects 
or externalities  for  other  countries,  and  that  a global optimum 
requires  that such externalities  be  taken  into account  in the decision— 
making  calculus.  3/  Coordination is  then  best seen as  a  facilitating 
mechanism  for  internalizing these  externalities. 
This  conclusion  can perhaps  be better  appreciated  by emphasizing 
the departures  from the competitive  model in today's  global 5cy• 
Cooper (1987)  has  identified  several  such departures,  and his analysis 
merits  some extension  here. 
Unlike the atomistic  economic  agents  of the competitive  model who 
base  their  consumption  and production  decisions on  prices  that are  beyond 
their control,  larger countries  exercise  a  certain  degree  of influence 
over  prices,  including  the real exchange  rate.  This of course raises 
the specter  that  they will  manipulate  such prices  to  their  own  advantage 
and  at  the expense of others.  Two  examples are  frequently  cited——one 
dealing with  inflation,  and  the other with  real  output  and  employment. 
Under floating rates,  a  Mundellian  (1971) policy mix of  tight monetary —4— 
and  loose  fiscal  policy  allows an appreciated  currency  to enhance 
a  country's  disinflationary  policy  strategy——but  at the cost of 
making  it harder  for trading  partners  to realize  their  own disinflation 
targets.  Similarly,  under conditions  of high capital  mobility  and 
sticky  nominal  wages, a monetary  expansion  under  floating  rates 
leads  to a real depreciation  and to an expansion  of output  and 
employment  at home.  But  the flip side of the coin is  that output 
and employment  contract abroad.  4/  Seen in this light,  the  role of 
coordination  is to prevent——or  to minimize——such  intentional  as well 
as unintentionel  "beggar—thy—neighbor"  practices.  Most international 
monetary  constitutions  have injunctions  against  "manipulating"  exchange 
rates or international reserves. 
The existence  of public  goods——and their role in the resolution 
of inconsistencies  among  policy  targets——constitute  a  second  important 
point  of departure from  the competitive  model.  When there  are  N 
currencies,  there  can be only N—I independent  exchange  rate targets. 
Similarly,  not all countries  can achieve independently  set targets 
for current  account surpluses. 
Adherents  of decentralized  policymaking——sometines  rather inappro- 
priately labelled  the  "German  schuol"——argue that  such inconsistencies 
provide  no justification for  intervention.  5/  Much  as in the  coapetitive 
model,  the economic system  will generate  signals——in  the form of changes 
in exchange  rates,  interest rates,  prices,  and incomes——that  will lead 
to an adjustment  of targets  such that they eventually  become  consistent. 
If,  however,  the path to consistency  involves  large swings  in real —5— 
exchange rates,  or even  more problematically,  the Imposition  of 
restrictions  on  trade  and  capital  flows, then reliance  on decentralized 
policynaking may  not  be globally  optimal.  Implicit  in  this conclusion 
is  the  notion that  a  certain degree  of stability in real  exchange rates 
and  an  open international trading  and  financial system are valued  in and 
of  themselves,  i.e.,  they are public goods  (in contrast, the market 
signals  that  resolve  supply/demand inconsistencies  in  the  competitive 
model, are not regarded as  public goods).  If  that  is accepted, there is 
a  positive  role for coordination,  both to identify target Inconsistencies 
at an early stage and to resolve  them in ways that do  not  produce  too 
little  of the public  good(s). 6/  It is of course  possible for groups 
of countries  who value  the public  good  highly to attempt  to obtain  more 
of it by setting  up "regional  zones  of exchange rate stability  or of 
free trade, and some have done just that (Including  the establishment  of 
the European  Monetary System (1S).  7/  But the essence  of a public 
good is  that it will tend  to be undersupplied  so long as some large 
suppliers  or users  act  in a decentralized  fashion. 
Once the realm  of atomistic  competitors  is left and  that of non- 
trivial  spillovers  of policies  is entered——be  it via goods,  asset,  or 
labor  markets——the  possibility  arises that choices made independently 
by national  governments  would not be as effective  in achieving their 
objectives as policies that are coordinated th other  governments. 8/ 
A  popular  example suffices to illustrate  the point.  Whereas  any single 
country  acting  alone  may be reluctant  to follow  expansionary  policies 
designed to counter  a global  deflationary  shock  for fear of unduly 
worsening  its external  balance, coordinated  expansion  by many countries —6— 
will loosen  the external  constraint  and permit  each  country  to move 
closer  to internal  balance. 
All of this establishes  a presumption  that  there can be valid 
reasons  for deviating  from the tradition  of decentralized  decision— 
making  when it comes  to economic  policy,  that is, that  there  is scope 
for  coordination.  This  presumption  is reinforced  by two empirical 
observations.  The first  is that the world economy  of 1988 is 
considerably  more open  and integrated  than that of 1950, or 1960,  or 
even of 1970.  Not only have  simple ratios of imports  or exports  to 
GNP increased  but  also——and  probably  more fundamentally——are  global 
capital  markets  more integrated.  9/  With larger  spillovers,  there  is 
more at stake  in how one manages  interdependence. Second,  there  is by 
now widespread  recognition  that the insulating  properties  of floating 
exchange  rates  are more  modest  than was suspected prior to their 
introduction  in 1973. 10/ 
But a presumption  that cooperation  could be beneficial  is  not  the 
same as a guarantee——nor  does it preclude the existence  of sometimes 
formidable  obstacles  to its  implementation. 
Suppose  national  policymakars  have a predilection  for inflationary 
policies  but are restrained  from implementing  them by  the concern that 
relatively  expansionary  mooetary policy  will bring on a devaluation 
(or depreciation).  Yet, as outlined  by Rogoff (1985), if all countries 
pursue  such inflationary  policies  simultaneously,  none  has  to worry 
about the threat  of devaluation.  Here,  coordination  may actually 
weaken  discipline  by easing the balance of payments  constraint.  In  a —7 
similar  vein,  as noted by Feldatein  (1988)  there  is the potential  risk 
that  a coordinated  attempt  to stabilize  a pattern  of nominal  or real 
exchange  rates  could take place  at an inappropriately  high aggregate 
rate  of inflation.  The proposals  put  forward  by U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Baker  and  U.K.  Chancellor  Lawson,  at the 1987 Annual  Meetings  of the 
Fund and the World Bank,  for a couatodity—price—baaket  indicator  as a 
potential 'early—warning"  signal of emerging aggregate  price  developments, 
addresses  just such a concern. 11/  Equally  troublesome  would be a 
coordination  of fiscal  policies that yielded  an aggregate  fiscal deficit 
for the  larger countries that put undue  upward pressure  on world interest 
rates.  The  basic  point is straightforward:  there  is nothing  in the 
coordination  process  in and of itself  that reduces  the importance  of 
sound  macroeconomic  policiea.  12/  There  can be coordination  around 
good policies and coordination  around  bad ones——just  as with the exchange 
rate regime,  where there  are good fixes  and bad fixes, and good floats 
and  bad floats.  13/  Welfare improvements  are not automatic. 
It is only realistic,  too,  to acknowledge  that there  are barriers 
to the exercise of coordination.  Four  of the more prominent  ones are 
worth  mentioning.  14/  First,  international  policy  bargains  that  involve 
shared  objectives  can be frustrated  if some policy  instruments  are 
treated  as objectives  in themselves.  Schultze  (1988),  for example, 
offers the view that  ft would have  been  difficult to  have reached  a 
bargain on target  zones  for exchange  rates  in the early  l9BOs  given 
President  Reagan's twin  commitmenta  to increased  defense spending  and —8— 
cutting  taxes.  In some other countries,  the constraints  on policy 
instruments  may  lie in different areas——including  structural  policies—— 
but the implications are the  same. 
Second,  there  can at  times  be  sharp disagreements  among  countries 
about  the effects that  policy changes have on  policy targets.  In  some 
cases,  these  differences  may extend  beyond  the size  to even the sign 
of various  policy—impact  multipliers.  15/  The harder  it is  to agree  on 
how the  world works,  the harder it  is to reach  agreement on  a jointly 
designed  set of policies. 
Third,  while  most  countries  have experienced  a marked  increaae in 
openness over  the  past few  decades,  there  remain huge  cross—country 
differences  in  the degree  of interdependence.  Large countries——the 
United States  being  the classic case in  point——are generally  less 
affected  by other countries'  policies than small  ones.  Coordination—— 
as Bryant  (1987)  has recently emphasized——is  not  a matter  of altruism. 
It is rather  the manifestation  of mutual  self  interest.  To the extent 
that large  countries  are less beset  by spillovers  and  feedbacks  than 
small ones,  the former's  incentive  to coordinate  on a continuous  basis 
may be lower.  16/  In this regard,  the high degree  of trade  interdependence 
shared by members  of the European  Monetary System  (EMS)  can be seen as 
a positive  factor  in reinforcing  incentives  to coordinate  in that  group. 
Finally,  as Polak  (1981)  has  reminded  us,  in terms of national 
priorities,  international  bargaining  typically  comes  after  domestic 
bargaining.  More  specifically,  the  compromise  of  growth and  inflation 
objectives  at the national level  may leave  little  room for further 
compromise  on  demand measures  at  the international level. —9— 
These bsrriers  to coordination  should  not be overestimated:  one 
of the clearest  examples of true coordination——the  Bonn Economic 
Summit of 1978——occurred  just when domestic  bargaining  over  the same 
issues  was most intense; 17/  the growing integration  of capital 
markets——of  which  the global  stock  market  crash  of October  1987  is but 
one reminder——has  brought the implications of  interdependence  home  to 
even large  countries;  and  continued  empirical  work  on multi—country 
models  should be able progressively to whittle  down  the margin of 
disagreement  on the effects  of policies.  Still,  ss readers  of Sherlock 
Holmes  will be awsre, sometimes the most telling  clue  is that the 
hounds  didn'  t  bark.  If the scope  for coordination  is to expand  beyond 
the efforta  of the past,  these  obstacles  will need to be overcome. 
Turning  from the scope  for to the scope  of coordination,  a 
key issue  concerns  the apprnpriate  range  and depth of policies to be 
coordinated. 
The  case for  aupporting  a wide—ranging,  multi—issue  appruach  to 
coordination  is that it increases the probability  of concluding  some 
policy  bargains  that benefit  all  parties,  18/  that favorable  spillover 
effecta  are generated  across negotiating  issues, and that improved 
economic performance  today  depends  as much on trade  and  structural 
policies as  on  exchange—rate and  demand policies.  Exhibit k  is  the 
Bonn  Economic  Summit of  1978 where commitments  to  accelerate growth 
by Japan and  the  Federal Republic  of  Germany were  exchanged for  a 
commitment  by the United States  to  come to grips with its  inflation 
and oil  problems,  and where agreement  on macroeconomic  and energy — 
1_U  — 
policies has been credited  with reinforcing  progress  on the Tokyo 
Round  of Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations.  19/ 
The defense  of a narrower  approach to coordination  rests  on the 
arguments  that negotiation  costs  rise rapidly with the spread  of 
Issues  under  consideration,  20/ that prospects for implementation 
of agreements  dim as the number  of jurisdictional  spheres  expands  (i.e., 
Finance  Ministers  can negotiate  agreements  but fiscal  policy  Is typically 
the responsibility  of legislatures,  while monetary policy  is the province 
of Independent  central  banks);  and that heated  disputes  on some issues 
(such  as the stance  of monetary  and fiscal policIes)  can frustrate  the 
chance  for agreements  in other  areas (like  defense  and foreign  assistance) 
where coordination  might  be more fruitful.  21/  In addition,  a case 
could  be made that coordination  is only likely n  areas  where there  is 
a consensus  about  the effects  of common  policIes.  22/ 
In view of these  conflicting  considerations,  it is hard to fault 
present  institutional  practices  on the range  of coordination.  Those 
practices  entail  high—frequency  coordination  on narrow  issues  in a 
multitude  of fora (such  as the International  Monetary Fund (IMF),  the 
Organization  of Economic  Cooperation  and Development  (DECO),  the Bank 
of International  Settlements  (815), and the General Agreement  of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT); 23/ less  frequent  (say,  biannual)  and wider coordna— 
tion  at a higher  level  in more limited  fora (such  as the LMF's  Interim 
Committee,  or the Group  of Seven  major industrial  countries);  and  even 
less  frequent  (annual),  wider—yet  coordInation  at the highest  level 
(heads  of state  and of governments  at the economic summits).  Thus, —  11 
— 
there are occasional opportunities  for multi—issue bargaining, but 
without the  exponential increase in negotiation costs  that  might  ensue 
if  this were  the  order  of  the day.  All  in all,  probably not  a  bad 
compromise. 
The  depth"  of coordination covers  the  degree of  specificity 
and  disaggregation  within  a given policy  area.  Here,  two issues arise—— 
one dealing  with fiscal  policy,  and the other with structural  policies. 
A  strong  implication  of recent  research is that aggregate  measures, 
such as the central  or general—government  fiscal  deficit,  are not 
likely to be a good  guide to the effects of fiscal  policies  on macro- 
economic variables  such as the current  account,  the exchange  rate,  and 
the rate of interest.  24/  The  reason  is  that such effects  depend on 
how the deficit  is altered:  that is,  taxes  versus  expenditures,  expen- 
ditures on tradables  versus nontradables,  taxes  on investment  versus 
those on saving,  fiscal  action by  a country  with a current  account 
surplus  versus  a deficit,  and anticipated  versus  unanticipated  policies. 
This suggests that mote specificity  in coordination——quite  apart from 
its positive  effect  on the ability to monitor  the  implementation  of 
agreed—on policies——would  be desirsble.  It is notable  that the Louvre 
Accord of February  1987 smong the Group of Seven  specified  not  only 
quantitative  tsrgets  for  budget  deficits but also  some quantitative 
guidelines  of how these  overall fiscal  targets  wets to be achieved. 25/ 
In the ares of structural  policies,  a good case can also be made 
for specificity——but  on somewhat  different grounds.  Here, coordination 
msy often best be interpreted  not as the simultsneous  spplicstion  of the —  12  — 
same  policy  instrument  in different  doses or directions  across  coun- 
tries,  but rather  as the simultaneous  application  of different policy 
instrumenta——Th/  with each country adopting the policy best tailored  to 
its particular  structural  weakness. 27/  in some cases,  this may imply 
reducing  impediments  to labor mobility  or to market—determined  wages; 
in others,  it may mean increasing  incentives  for private investment 
relative to those for  private  saving;  and in still  others,  it may mean 
changes n  the trade  and distribution  system.  The simultaneous  appli- 
cation  of the policy  measures across  countries  may be necessary  to 
overcome  the blocking  tactics  of domestic pressure  groups and  to enhance 
the credibility  of the exercise.  Again,  the depth or specificity  of 
coordination  can be as relevant  as the range. 
Another  salient  issue  concerns  the question  of when to coordinate. 
There has been,  and continues to be, wide variation  in the frequency 
of coordination  across  different fora——ranging  from one—of—a—kind 
meetings like  the 1971 smithsonian  Conference  on exchange  rates  to 
the near continuous  discussion  and decision  making  at the Executive 
Boards  of the LMF and  the World Bank. 
-  One  position  is that,  given the constraints,  true coordination 
cannot  be expected  to be more than an  episodic,  regime—preserving 
effort.  Dini  (1988)  has  recently  argued that international  consider- 
ations still  play  only a small  factor  in policy  making,  and  that only 
at times  of crisis  is a common interest  in coordinated  action  clearly 
recognized.  28/  Some  might even go farther  and argue  that the reservoir 
of international  compromise  should be conserved  for situations  when —  13  — 
there is  a high  probability of a policy  deal and when failure  to reach 
an agreement  would carry  a high cost. 
Our view is  that both the likelihood  and effectiveness  of coordi- 
nation will be enhanced  when  it is  a  regular,  on—going  process——and 
for  at least three  reasons.  First,  the potential for multiperiod 
bargaining  expands  the opportunities  for policy  bargains  (by facilitating, 
for example,  phasing of policy  meaaures) .  What  should  count  in  assess- 
ing  the gains  to coordination  is the present  discounted  value  of welfare— 
improving  policy  agreements  over an extended  period——not  the welfare 
change  in a single period.  Second,  as suggested  in the game—theoretic 
literature,  the existence  of repeated  bargaining  strengthens  the role 
of reputational  considerations  in coordination.  29/  In contrast,  when 
coordination  is a once—and—for—all  or episodic  exercise,  there  is a 
higher risk that agreed policies  will never  be implemented  because  of 
the much—discussed  problem  of time—inconsistency,  i.e.,  the temptation 
to renege  on earlier policy  commitments  when it  later  becomes 
advantageous  to do so.  30/  To be effective,  coordination  agreements 
need to pass  through  the market filter of credibility,  and credibility 
is more likely  if sticking to the agreement  enhances  reputation,  which 
in turn allows  profitable  bargains  to be struck  in the future.  Third, 
once  coordination  is established  as a routine  on—going  process,  there 
is apt to be more freedom  of policy  maneuver for all participants  than 
when  negotiations  are conducted  in a crisis  atmosphere  and when dis- 
agreements——which  after all are inevitable——may  be inappropriately 
seen as signaling  the collapse  of coordination  itself.  31/ —  14  — 
As  any good newspaper  reporter  knows,  the  three Wa of why, 
what and when are not  sufficient  for writing  a story.  One also has to 
bring in the fourth W,  namely who  should  coordinate.  Again,  existing 
practice  does  not  provide  a definitive  answer.  Among the industrial 
countries,  we have the Group  of Seven  and  the Group of Ten.  For  the 
developing  countries,  there sre the Group  of Twenty—Four  and the Group 
of Seventy  Seven.  And in the Executive  Board  of the Fund——where  industrial 
and developing  countries  alike are represented——there  are twenty—two 
representatives  of various country  groupings——a  Group of  Twenty—Two. 
Among the factors  that should  influence  the size of the coordinat- 
ing group,  three would seem to stand  out.  First, to the extent that 
the raison  d'etre  of coordination  is the internalization  of externalities, 
the group  should  include  those countries  whose  policies  generate the 
largest  externalities. This  argues for including  the largest  industrial 
countries.  Second,  there is the general  proposition  that the costs of 
negotiation,  and conflicts  that might endenger the continuity  of the 
exercise,  increase  significantly  with the number  of players.  This 
argues for  a relatively small  group.  Third,  and pointing in the 
opposite direction,  a small group runs  the risk of concluding  policy 
agreements  which are beneficial  to the direct  participants——but  which 
are not satisfactory  to those countries  not sitting  at the coordination 
table.  32/ 
In  light of these  considerations,  it is worth  mentioning  two 
features  of recent  coordination  efforts  by the Group of Seven.  One 
of them, proposed  at the Venice  Economic Summit  in 1987 and incorporated 
in subsequent  coordination  meetlogs,  is the addition  of aggregate -15- 
indicators  for the Group  of Seven  as a whole to  the list of individual— 
country  indicators.  Aggregate indicators  for the group may include 
such  variables  as the growth  rate of real  GNF and of domestic  demand, 
the interest  rate,  the  current  account  position,  and  the real exchange 
rate.  A strong  motivation for such aggregate  indicators  is that  they 
can be helpful in gauging the impact  of G—7  coordination  agreements 
and actions  among  the Group  of Seven  on the rest—of—the—world,  with 
particular  reference  to the developing  countries.  For example,  it has 
been estimated  that  each 1 percent change  in real  GNP in the industrial 
countries  is associated,  ceteris  paribus,  with approximately  a  3  percent 
change  (in the same direction)  of export earnings  in developing  countries. 
Similarly,  a  1  percent  change in "world  interest  rates  implies  roughly 
a S3—4 billion change  in net intereat  payments  by capital  importing 
developing  countries.  In short,  aggregate  indicators  can be seen aa 
an analytical  instrument  for helping  to evaluate  whether a given 
policy package for  the  larger countries  is also  in the interest  of 
others. 
A  second  notable feature is that the Managing  Director  of the 
Fund  participates  in these  Group of Seven  coordination  meetings.  Since 
the Fund's membership  includes not only the larger  industrial  countries 
but also the smaller industrial  countries,  as well as moat of the 
developing  countries,  one rationale  for the Managing  Director's 
participation  is that  it provides  a systemic  perspective  and evaluation 
on proposed  policy  agreements——while  still keeping  the meeting small 
enough  for administrative  efficiency. —  16  — 
II  Methods  of Coordination 
This section,  shifts the focus  from  whether  to coordinate  to 
how to coordinate.  More specifically,  the advantages  and disadvantages 
of alternative  methods of coordination  are discussed,  with particular 
attention  to the  issues of rules  versus  discretion,  single  versus 
multi—indicator  approaches,  and hegemonic  versus  symmetric  systems. 
It is not surprising  that  many of the issues  that emerged 
during  the long and continuing  debate  on the relative  merits  of rules 
versus  discretion  in domestic  economic  policy  should  have resurfaced  in 
the dialogue  on international  economic  policy  coordination.  After all, 
the present  system  of managed floating,  even  as it has  evolved  since 
the Plaza  Agreement  of September  1985,  is much closer  to a pure  discretion 
than to a pure rules  model.  In this regard,  the gold standard  with its 
automatic  specie  flow  mechanism,  the adjustable  peg system  with its 
clesr  implications  for the subordination  of domestic  monetary policy  to 
the exchange  rate (except  during  fundamental  disequilibria),  the 1S 
with its parity  grid and divergence  indicator,  target  zone  proposals 
with their trigger  for coordination  discussions  whenever the actual 
exchange  rate threatens  to breach the zone,  and pure floating  with its 
complete  prohibition  on all official  intervention  in the exchange 
market——all  can be considered  less discretionary  than  the present 
exchange rate system.  The debate is thus not about what is,  but rather 
about  what should  be. —  17  — 
Those who support a more rules—based  approach to international 
economic policy  rest their  case  on essentially  four arguments.  First, 
the most promising  route to eliminating  any excess  demand for coordina- 
tion in the world econcoy  is not by increasing the supply,  but rather  by 
decreasing  the demand  (or  the need)  for coordination.  33/  That decrease 
in demand,  in turn,  can best be brought about by the application  of 
simple  policy  rules,  such as the maintenance  of a fixed  exchange  rate. 
In the process,  one would eliminate——so  the argument  goes——most  of the 
negotiation  costs  and burden—sharing  conflicts  that are intrinsic  to 
more discretionary  systems.  Second,  rules  are  regarded  as the only 
viable  mechanism  for  imposing  discipline  on economic policymakera  who 
might otherwise manipulate  the  instruments of  policy for  their  own 
objectives. 34/  Third,  rules are regarded  as  enhancing  the predict- 
ability of  policy actions  and  thereby  improving the private  sector's 
ability to  make  informed  resource allocation decisions.  35/  Fourth, 
rules  are championed  as  providing  protection against  the lack  of 
knowledge  about  how  the  economy operates by  pre—empting destabilizing 
fine—tuning. 
The  main counter—arguments in  favor of  a  discretionary  approach 
are the following.  First, rule—based  adjustment systems often turn  out 
to  be  less  automatic  in practice  than in theory.  For  exorple,  the 
automaticity  of  the  specie—flow  mechanism under  the hiatorical gold 
standard was  often undermined by  the proclivity of  authorities to 
offset or  sterilize the effect of  gold flows.  36/ —  18  — 
Second,  rules  will  impart  discipline  to the conduct  of macro— 
econcmic  policy only to the extent that  the penalties  for breaking the 
rules  are significant  enough to ensure  that  the rules  are  followed. 
The  Bretton Woods rule that countries  should  consult  with the Fund 
once there was a cumulative  parity  change  of 10 percent or  more, 
while  complied  with in a technical  sense,  fell short  in a substantive 
sense  of its original  purpose.  The discussion  surrounding  the revision 
of the original Cramm—Rudman  deficit—reduction targets  in the United 
States is  a more  recent case in point.  History could  in fact  be  seen 
as just as kind to  the  proposition that  the policy regime adjusts to the 
amount  of discipline  that countries  want to have——as to the reverse.  37/ 
Also,  care  needs to be taken  to separate the effects of policy  rules 
on economic  outcomes  from other  influences.  In this connection,  the 
oft—made  argument that the EMS was  a major determinant  of the 1979—85 
disinflation  in Europe  would seem to  be based  on shaky  ground. 38/ 
Third, it is by no  means  clear  that rules  are  necessary  to obtain 
the benefits  of greater predictability of  policy.  For  example,  the 
practice  of  pre—announcing  money—supply targets——sometimes  accompanied 
by  announcements  of  public—sector  burrowing requirements——provides  the 
markets  with information  on the authorities'  policy  intentions,  but 
stops  well  short of a  rigid  rule. 
Finally,  while rules diminish the risk emanating  from fine tuning, 
they  increase  the risk stemming from  lack of adaptability  to changes  in 
the operating  environment.  39/  The idea  of a 'craw1ing—peg"  rule —  19  — 
based  on inflation  differentials  drew  quite a few supporters  in the 
1960s  as the right  antidote  for  sticky  nominal  exchange  rates.  Yet 
its neglect  of the need for real exchange  rate  changes  now seems  more 
serious  in light  of the real economic  disturbances  of the early 
l970s.  40/  More recently,  the crumbling  of the link between  narrow 
monetary  aggregates  and  the ultimate  targets  of monetary  policy  in the 
face of large  scale  financial  innovation  and institutional  change  has 
reminded  us anew  of the limitations  of policy  rules. 
In light  of all  this,  there  may not  be any attractive  alternative 
to conducting  economic  policy  coordination  in a judgmental  way. 
Even  after the choice  is made about  coordinating  via rules  or 
discretion,  there  remains  the decision  of whether  to coordinate 
around  a single  indicator  or a set of indicators.  A regime  of fixed 
exchange  rates  or target  zones  is an example of the former  approach, 
while the ongoing  Group  of Seven coordination  exercise  is an example 
of the latter. 
There  are two main considerations  that are typically  advanced 
to support  the single—indicator  spproach.  One  is that it avoids 
over—coordination  of  policies by  presening for  each country freedon 
of action  over  those  policies not  used  to  reach  the  single  target 
variable.  Thus,  for example,  if the exchange rate  is  the focus of 
coordination,  monetary policy  will be constrained,  but other policies 
will be less affected.  tmplicit  in this line of argument  is the view 
that attempts  to place  many policies  under international  coordination —  20  — 
will ultimately  prove  self  defeating  and may even induce national 
authort1es  to  compensate by exercisIng  greater independence in 
uncoordInated  policy Instruments, such as trade  policy.  41/ 
The  second,  and probably  more important,  defense of a single— 
indicator  approach  is that it sends  a clear  signal to markets  about 
the course  of future  policy.  If, for example,  the monetary authorities 
commit  themselves  to maintain  a fixed  exchange  rate within  a given 
band,  then  movements  of the  exchange rate provide an unambiguous  guide 
for monetary policy.  A similar  message would derive  from  a nominal 
income  target  for monetary  or fiscal  policy, with the exchange  rate 
left to determination  of the market.  In contrast,  a  multI—Indicator 
approach  increases  the authorities'  scope for discretion  since they 
can appeal  to the conflIctIng  messages coming  from dIfferent  Indicators. 
In cases where the authorities'  past  record  of policy  performance  has 
been weak  and where a single  objectIve  of policy  is predominant  (such 
as disinflation),  a single—indicator  framework  for coordination  can 
carry significant  advantages  in the battle to restore  credibility  to 
policy. 
But relying  on a single  polIcy  IndIcator  can also carry 
substantial  risks.  Perhaps  the most serIous one is that  the single 
indicator  can send  weak——or  even false——signals  about the need for 
changes  in other policies  that are not beIng  coordInated.  This is 
perhaps  best illustrated  by considering  the problem  of errant  fiscal 
policy  under  a regime  of fixed exchange  rates  or of target  zones. 
First,  consider  fixed  rates.  With high  capital  mobility,  a fiscal 
expansion  will yield an incipient positive  interest  rate  differential, —  21  — 
a  capital  inflow, and an overall  balance  of payments surplus——not  a 
deficit.  Here, exchange rate fixity  helps  to finance——and  by no means 
disciplines——irresponsible  fiscal policy. 42/  Only if and when the 
markets expect  fiscal  deficits to be monetized  will they force  the 
authorities  to choose  between fiscal  policy  adjustments  and deval- 
uation.  43/  The better  the reputation  of the authorities,  the longer 
in coming will be the discipline  of markets, i.e. 
,  the  exchange  rate 
will provide only  a weak and late signal  for policy  adjustment.  In 
this connection,  it is worth  observing  that whereas  the EMS has produced 
a notable  convergence  of monetary policy,  convergence  of fiscal  policy 
has not taken  place.  44/ 
Next,  rerun  the same fiscal  expansion  under  a target  zone regime, 
where  the zones are to be defended  by monetary  policy.  In such  a 
scenario,  the appreciation  of the currency  induced  by the fiscal 
action will  prompt  a loosening  of monetary  policy  to keep the rate from 
breaching  the zone.  Here,  coordination  around  a single  indIcator, 
namely,  the exchange  rate,  will have exacerbated——not  corrected——the 
basic cause  of the problems.  45/  The single  indIcator  would  have Sent 
the wrong signal  for policy  adjustment. 
In contrast,  a multi—indicator  approach  to coordination——assuming 
that  the list of indicators  included  monetary  and fiscal policy 
variables——would  not be susceptIble  to this weak  or false—sIgnal 
problem.  46/  This  is because such an approach  goes directly to the 
basic stance of fiscal  and monetary policies,  rather  than passing —  22  — 
through  the  medium of  the exchange  rate.  If, for example,  the impetus 
for coordination  was a misalignment  of exchange  rates,  and  if the 
root cause of  the  misalignment  was  an inappropriate  stance  and/or mix 
of monetary  and fiscal  policies,  the multi—indicator  approach  would be 
appealing. 
But all is not a bed of roses  here either.  While  all effective 
approaches  to coordination  require  a consiatency  of policy  instruments 
and  targets within  and across  countries,  this requirement  of consistency 
or compatibility  can take an added prominence  when authorities  make 
public  a set of targets and  intended  courses  for policy  instruments.  47/ 
Two aspects  merit explicit  mention.  One  ia that exchange  rate 
targets——or  even concerted  views  on the existing  pattern  of exchange 
rates——must  be consistent  with the announced  course  of monetary  and 
fiscal  policies.  Without that consistency,  attempts to provide  the 
market with  an anchor  for medium—term  exchange  rate expectations  are 
likely  to prove  fruitless. 
The second  point  is that  the credibility  of multiple  policy targets 
also hinges  on the constraints  on policy  instruments.  Two such constraints 
are the striking  inflexibility  of fiscal  policy  in almost  all industrial 
countries,  48/ and the limited  ability  of sterilized  exchange  market 
intervention  to affect the level of the exchange  rate over the medium— 
term (unless of course  it provides  a signal about  the future  course  of 
policies).  49/  A relevant  concern is that limitations  on other policy 
instruments  may wind up with  monetary policy  being asked  to carry too —  23  — 
heavy  a burden——with  primary responsibility  for maintaining  internal 
and external  balance.  In such a case,  any contribution  that a multi— 
indicator  approach  to coordination  could  make to enhancing the predict- 
ability  of pnlicies  would also be diminished.  This is so because  a 
shock to the system——such  as the October  1987 global  stock market  crash——— 
might raise  the question  in minds of market  participants  of whether 
monetary policy would serve its  internal  or external  master. 
Yet another  key methodologicsl  issue  associated  with coordina- 
tion——particularly  when it involves joint decision making——is  whether 
one  country should,  by  common  consent, have a  predominant voice on 
the  course  of policies,  or alternatively,  whether  that influence  should 
be shared  more equally.  In this  respect,  the historical  gold standard, 
the Eretton  Woods  system,  and the EMS are all often regarded  as hegemunic 
systems,  while  the ongoing Oroup of Seven  coordination  process  would 
qualify  as  a  more  symmetric exercise.  50/ 
Hegemonic  exchange  rste systems have typically  operatod  under 
what might be called  an "implidit  contract"  between  the leader  and  the 
satellite  countries.  51/  Under Bretton Woods,  the leader  (that  is,  the 
United  States)  carried  the obligation  to conduct  prudent  macroeconomic 
policies——perhaps  best summarized by a steady,  low rate of inflation. 
This obligation  was  reinforced  by the leader's  commitment  to peg some 
nominal  price——in  that case,  the price  of  gold.  Since  there can be 
only N—i  exchange  rates  among N countries,  the leader  was  passive 
about its exchange  rate.  The satellite  countries  committed to peg —  24  — 
their  exchange  rates  within  agreed  margins to the leader.  As a reaction 
to the competitive  depreciation  of  the 1930s,  cumulative  exchange  rate 
adjustments  greater  than 10 percent  were to be placed under international 
supervision  and were to be taken  only under  conditions  of  fundamental 
disequilbrium.'  By virtue of their  exchange  rate obligations,  the 
satellites  sacrificed  independence  in their monetary policies  but 
expected to import  stability  from the leader. 
With the benefit  of hindsight,  that this implicit  contract 
came under  strain from two main directions  (in addition  to Triffin's 
(1960) well—known  confidence  problem.')  One was the breakdown  (after 
the mid—1960s)  of discipline  by the leader such that  the satellites 
came to see it as exporting  inflation  rather  than stability.  The 
response  was  for the satellites  to sever their  formal  links  with the 
leader  (in the early  1970s) and thereafter  to seek stability  via other 
mechanisms,  inlcuding national  money—supply targeting  and regional 
exchange rate arrangements.  The second atrain  was an excessive  rigidity 
of nominal exchange rates  in  the face of  fundamental disequilibrium 
that  produced a misalignment  of  the leader's real  exchange rate in the 
late l960s.  The  leader  then abandoned the  commitment  to  be  passive 
about  its exchange rate. 
The implicit contract  in the E1S is similar in many  ways  to that 
under Bretton  Woods.  While there is  no  formal  leader,  most  observers 
regard the Federal  Republic  of  Germany (and its  Bundesbank)  as the de 
facto or acknowledged  leader.  52/  Germany follows  macroeconomic 
policies that export  price stability  and anti—inflationary —  25  — 
credibility  to  the others.  It is  noteworthy  that while  there have to 
date been 11  realignments  in the  EMS,  none  of  them has  resulted  in a 
revaluation  relative  to  the deutsche  mark,  thus  leaving Germany's 
reputation  as so exporter of stability  intact.  Other members of the 
exchange rate mechanism  of the EMS can be characterized  as •tying 
their  hands" on domestic  monetary policy  so as to make credible  both 
their  exchange  rate obligations  and their  inflation  objectives.  53/ 
Exchange rate adjustments  are placed  under  common  supervision.  When 
realignments  do take  place,  they do not  always  provide full compensation 
for past inflation  differentials.  In  this way,  the resulting  real 
appreciation  for high—inflation  countries  can act as a disincentive  to 
inflation  (by penalizing exports,  output,  and  employment), while  the 
leader  receives  a gain in competitiveness  that  provides  some quid—pro— 
quo for  its export of anti—inflationary  credibility.  54/  Monetary 
policy  in Germany  is typically  regarded  as the anchor  and is considered 
so disciplined  as to do away with the need to peg to some "outside' 
nominal  price. 
While  there have clearly been perioda  when large  countries  have 
exerted  a stabilizing  influenoe  on the system,  it is hard to aocept 
that hegemony  is a necessary  characteristic  of a well—functioning  system 
of international  economio peiioy  coordination.  There  are several reasons. 
First,  careful.  study of alleged hegemonio  systems,  including  the gold 
standard,  reveals  that the  amount of coordination  needed  for  amooth 
functioning  was substantial.  55/  The coordinated  interest  rate actions —  26  — 
of  September  1987 in the EMS when  Germany  and  the Netherlands  lowered 
their rates,  and France  raised  its rate,  are a recent example  of such 
cooperation.  Second, much of what passes  for  the stabilizing  influence 
of hegemony  can also reflect common  objectives.  Again,  the EMS serves 
as a useful  laboratory.  In the early 1980s, disinflation  was  the top 
priority  in virtually  all EMS countries.  Since  Germany  had the best 
reputation  fot price  stability,  there was a cmonality  of interests 
in trying  to converge  to the German  inflation  rate.  Now,  however, 
some observers  argue  that  given  both the progress  already  made with 
inflation  and the high unemployment  rates  prevailing  in some EMS  (and 
potential  EMS) countries,  it is time  to give greater  weight to objectives 
other than  inflation.  56!  If such  a decision  were taken, it would 
probably  result in a more symmetric  EMS——and  this quite  apart  from 
shifts  among  members  in relative  economic size or reputation.  57/ 
Third,  attempts  to reinstate  a hegemonic  approach  to  coordination  when 
economic  realities  no longer  support  it could  be counterproductive. 
In the present  context,  there  appears  to be no obvious  candidate that 
combines  an  unblemished  record  for economic  stability,  a dominant 
position  in international  trade  and finance  (relative  to other members 
of the coordination  group),  and a willingness  to accept the requisite 
responsibilities. —  27  — 
III  The Effects  of Coordination 
Identifying  key issues related  to the scope  and methods  of economic 
policy  coordination  is one  thing; attempting  to infer  its effects  is 
quite another.  The  later is obviously  an empirical question that 
requires  for analysis  some type of quantitative  economic  model. 
Earlier  efforts  to gauge the effects  of international  economic 
policy  coordination  or of alternative  international  monetary  arrangements 
fall into two categories.  One strand  of the literature  compares the 
value  of a welfare  function where  each country  maximizes  welfare  indepen- 
dently  with that where  the coontries  maximize  a joint welfare  function. 
Two controversial  findings  are  that the gains  from coordination  are 
likely  to be Thmall"  for the largest  countries  and  that the gains  can 
even be negative  if countries  coordinate  using  the wrong' model of the 
world economy.  58/ 
These  findings  should  not be used  as an indictment  of coordination—— 
for at least  five  reasons.  First,  a comparison  of optimal uncoordinated 
with optimal  coordinated  policies  may not be generalizable  to the more 
relevant  comparison  of suboprimal  uncoordinated  with suboptiool  coordinoted 
policies.  In particular,  the  link between pressures for protectionism on 
the  one  hand,  and  recession  and  exchange  rates on  the  other,  could  result 
in  quite  a different  counterfactual  (i.e.,  what would  happen  in the 
absence  of coordination)  than  that assumed  in these  studies.  59/  Second, 
some  of the gains  froa coordination  may be unobservable  (unwritten 
pledges  to alter policies  in the future),  or difficult  to separate from —  28  — 
less  ambitious  forms of cooperation  (exchange  of information  across 
countries),  or extend  beyond  the realm  of macroeconomic  policy  (joint 
measures to combat terrorism,  to harmonize  nternaconal fare schedules 
for air travel,  and so on).  Third,  a judgment that gains  from coordination 
are small  presupposes  some standard  of comparison.  Would  the gains  from 
international  coordination be  small relative  to  the gains  from  coordi- 
nation of  policies  across  different  economic agencies  within  a national 
government?  Fourth,  empirical  estimates  of gains from coordnaton have 
typically  compared  policies  that do not exploit  the incentive  governments 
have to adhere to agreements  in order to enhance their  reputation  for 
consistency.  Currie,  Levine  and Vidals (1987)  argue, n  contrast,  that 
comparison  of reputatonal  policies  shows  large  gains.  Fifth,  the 
danger  that coordination  may reduce  welfare because  policymakers  use  the 
wrong model(s)  is greatest f  they ignore  model  uncertainty.  If,  however, 
policymakers  recognize  that  they do not know the true model  and take 
this uncertainty  into account,  policy  may be aet in a more cautious 
fashion,  with positive  effects on the gains  from  coordination.  60/ 
The second  strain  of the empirca1  literature  attempts to quantify 
the effects  of specific  policy  proposals  (such  as  the introduction  of 
target  zones)  by comparing  them  either  with a baseline that describes 
the current policy  stance,  or with historical  values  for  the macroeconomi 
variables  of interest.  This typically  involves the simulation  of a 
global econometric  model.  Such an application of  models  is still in its 
infancy.  To  date, most  attentIon has been paId  to rule—based  proposals —  29  — 
for  policy  coordination  that  focus  on real  effective  exchange  rates. 
Two examples  of such studies  are Edison,  Miller,  and Williamson  (1987) 
and  Currie  and Wren—Lewis  (1987).  They compsre  simulated  outcomes  of 
cooperative  policy  rules  to recent historical  experience.  Both of these 
studies,  however,  are  open to the classic  Lucas  (1976) critique  that, 
due to the endogeneity  of expectstions  of economic  agents,  estimates  of 
"structural  parameters"  will differ  under different  policy  regimes;  in 
these  studies,  expectations  are formed  in a mechanistic  fashion—— 
independent  of the policy  regime. 
This  chapter  reports  some initial  rule—based  simulations  from s 
global  macroeconomic  model  developed  in the Research  Department  of the 
Fund,  called  MIJLTIMOD.  Two questions are addressed:  first, would s 
smoother  path of monetary  snd fiscal  policies  have produced  a smoother 
path for real exchange  rates,  resl output,  and inflation  than that 
observed  historically;  and  second, what would be the variability  of 
policy  instruments  under s simple  or extended  "target  zone"  scheme 
where the real effective  exchange  rate is  treated as an intermediate 
target?  61!  The "effects'  of coordination  are generated  by comparing 
the counterfactual  simulstions  to a baseline  simulation  where  MULTB'IOD 
is constrained  to replicate  the historical  data  over 1974—87  by includ- 
ing  the appropriate  residuals  in each equation.  These  same residuals 
are also  used  in the counterfactual  simulations,  each of which postulates 
that policy  would have  been different  in some way from its historical 
stance. —  30  — 
By virtue  of  using  MULTDIOD for the simulations,  this  approach 
differs from earlier  work in two important  respects.  One is that 
expectations  are  forward—looking  and reflect  the stance of policy.  This 
permits  expectations  to  differ across different policy regimes.  62!  For 
instance,  if it is known that  the monetary  authorities  will resist  move- 
ments away from an Thquilibrium"  level  for the exchange rate,  then this 
will condition  the value expected  for the exchange  rate in the future. 
In this sense,  the results  are less subject  to the Lucas  critique than 
previous  work.  63!  in a related  vein,  the model attributes  complete 
credibility  to  the government' a  policy stance and  assumes  that the private 
sector  forms  its expectations in a  fashion that turns  out  to  be  correct 
ex  post.  Thus,  it gives  a potentially powerful  influence to changes in 
present and future  policies.  Second, although this section concentrates 
on the larger  industrial  countries,  MULTIMOD  contains a fully specified 
developing—country  block. 
Before proceeding  to a  capsule  summary of  MULTLMOD  and  to  the 
simulations  themselves,  it is worth  emphasizing  a caveat.  This paper  is 
the first attempt to apply  MULTIMOD to policy  coordination  issues. 
The results  should,  therefore,  be considered  tentative,  preliminary,  and 
relevant  only to a few rule—based  proposals.  Much more will need to be 
learned  over time about  which aspects  of the simulation  are quite model 
specific,  about the sensitivity  of the conclusions  to particular  parameter - 31  — 
values  and historical  periods,  and about  the effects of alternative 
coordination  proposals——including  those  that rely on judgmental or 
discretionary  application  of policies. 
MEILTIMOD is documented  fully  elsewhere  and we will therefore  limit 
ourselves  here to  describing  its msin features.  64/  The model contains 
submodela  for  the three  largest industrial  countries  separately——that  is, 
for  the United  States,  Japan and the Federal  Republic  of Germany——for  the 
remaining four Group of Seven countries  as a group (France,  the United 
Kingdom,  Italy and Canada),  and fot the remaining  smaller  industrial 
countries  as a group.  Developing  countries  (excluding  the high—income 
oil exporters)  are modeled as one region,  but with some industrial 
disaggregation.  Each of the country  or regional  submodels has equations 
explaining  the components  of aggregate  demand  as well as the supply  of 
the various  goods produced.  The submodels  are  linked  through  trade  and 
financial  flows.  The parameters  of the behavioral  equations  are in most 
part  estimated  using  annual data available  since  the early 1960s. 
In the case of industrial  countries,  financial  markets  are assumed 
to exhibit both perfect capital mobility and perfect substitutability 
between  assets denominated in different currencies.  65/  Consequently, 
arbitrage conditions link  the returns  on  long—  and  short—term bonds  and  on 
domestic  and foreign  honda.  Moreover,  as suggested  earlier,  expectations 
are assumed  to  be forward—looking,  and  to be consistent  with the model's 
solution  in future  periods.  Thus  interest  parity  holds  both ex ante and 
ex post in  model  simulations  where  future  variables are correctly  antici- 
pated——that  is,  where  there  are no "surprises."  66/  As a result,  the —  32  — 
change  tn the exchange rate bet5en  two  currencies  from  one  period to 
the next is determined  by  their Interest differential  prevaIling in the 
first period. 
Similarly,  expected long—term  bond  rates and  rates of  inflation 
are also  consistent  with  the model's solutions  for  future  periods  in the 
absence  of further  shocks.  The rate  of inflation——unlike  prices  in 
financial  markets——is  not assumed perfectly  flexible,  Instead,  rigidi- 
ties In wage and  product markets make for persistent  effects oa output  as 
a result of purely  monetary  shocks;  only in the medium—  to long—run  will 
full employment  result.  67/  Thus,  both  monetary and fiscal  policies  of 
the industrial countries  have signifIcant and persistent effects on  real 
varIables, both in the country  undertaking  the policy  change  and  in other 
countries. 
In order to provide  some feel for the properties  of  MULTIMOD, 
Table  1 shows  the effects  of monetary  and  fIscal  policies  in each of the 
three  major  countries  on itself,  on the other three  major countries,  and 
on the remaining  Group of  Seven  countrIes.  These  policy changes  are 
assumed  to be unanticipated  at the time  of initiation.  Two comments  are 
in order  about the results.  First,  and not surprisingly,  policy  actions 
taken by the UnIted  States  have much larger  splllover  effects  than those 
undertaken  In Japan  or In the Federal RepublIc  of Germany.  This reflects 
the large sIze of the U.S. economy  and  the fact that,  while  a relatively 
closed  economy to imports,  a relatively  large  share of Its imports  come 
from other  Group of Seven  countrIes.  Japan  Is only roughly half as —  33  — 
large  (in terms of  GNP)  and obtains more of its imports  from outside the 
Group sources.  Germany is  the  most open but is smaller  than Japan;  the 
spillovers  of its actions primarily  affect  other  European  countries. 
Second,  while  both monetary  and fiscal  policies  have  strong effects on 
domestic  real  output  over the medium—term,  fiscal  policy  has a much 
larger  own—effect  on the current  account  than does monetary  policy.  68/ 
This  is because  the output and relative—price  effects  go in the same 
direction  for a fiscal policy  change,  whereas  they  offset  each other in 
the  case of monetary  policy.  A fiscal  expansion,  for example,  induces 
an appreciation  of the real exchange rate and an increase  in domestic 
demand——both  of which lead to a fall  in  net  exports.  69/  In contrast, 
a monetary expansion  yields  a depreciation  of tl: real  exchange rate—— 
which promotes  net exports——and  an increase  in domestic  demand—— 
which penalizes  them;  because  the relative—price  effect  dominates——at 
least  in the case of the United  States and Japan——the  result  is a small 
improvement  in the current  account. 
One rather  minimalist  interpretation  of coordination  is that large 
countries should  use  their monetary and fiscal  policies  in a largely 
independent  decentralized  way  but  should  avoid  sharp  changes in policy 
stance  that would,  in turn,  generate  sharp changes  in real  exchange  rates. 
Such a concession  to internalizing  externalities  would not affect  the 
ultimate  size  of  the stock  adjustment  of actual  to  desired  policies but 
would  constrain  the speed of  adjustment——much  in  the  same spirit  that 
speed  limits  in boat marinas discourage  large  boats  from producing  wakes —  34  — 
that  would topple  smaller  boats.  One exponent  of  smoothing"  guidelines 
is Corden  (1986,  p. 431),  who states:  70/ 
If we accept that the spillover  effects  of a foreign 
fiscal  policy  change  can be defined  as the adverse 
effects  of the destabilization  of the real exchange 
rate,  two implications  follow. 
The most important  implication  is  that each country 
benefits the other by maintaining  relatively  stable policies, 
meaning policies  which will minimize  real exchange—rate 
changes  in either  direction.  Coordination  consists 
essentially  of a reciprocal  agreement  to modify  policies 
that generate real exchange—rate  instability." 
Charts  1  to 3 sinmarize  developments  for some  indicators  of policy 
stance  since the first  full year of generalized  floating  (1974),  while 
Chart  4 gives  a measure of real effective  exchange  rates  for the Group 
of Seven  countries.  71/  There  are well—known  difficulties  in getting 
good policy  indicators,  including  the problem  that each of the series—— 
money growth,  the share  of government  purchases  on goods and services  in 
GNP,  and the ratio  of tax receipts  less  non—interest  transfer  payments 
to net national  product  and interest  receipts——are  all endogenous  to 
some extent.  It should also  be emphasized  that  this historical  period 
contains  several  different  policy  regimes,  ranging  fror  irgeting of 
monetary aggregates  over much of the earlier part  of the period,  to the 
strengthening  of intenational economic  policy  coordination  since  the 
Plaza  Agreement  of September  1985. 
Nevertheless,  some useful  stylized  facts  emerge  from an examination 
of historical  data.  First,  money  growth  rates  are quite volatile and 
appear  to be postive1y  correlated  across  economies.  Second,  taxes  net 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6—  35  — 
evidence  of fiscal stimulus in the United States  in 1983 is clear. 
Finally,  real exchange rates  exhibit  large  fluctuations,  especially  for 
the  United  States. 
To estimate the effects of 'smoother  policies,  each of the variables 
in Charts 1 to 3 was replaced by its five—year  moving average.  Those 
values then  wee input as exogenous  variables  into MTJLTIMOD and the 
values  of endogenous  variables were calculated. 
Table  2  presents the mean and standard  deviation  of several macro- 
economic indicators, comparing their historical  values  with  those resulting 
from  a  simulation of  smoother policies.  Interestingly enough,  smoothing of 
policy variables is nowhere near  sufficient to  produce  smooth  values for 
major macroeconomic  variables.  On the contrary,  such a simple  smoothing 
rule tends  to accentuate  some of the fluctuations  in the historical  data. 
For example,  though  the average growth  of real gross  domestic product  is 
about the same as in the historical data,  its  standard deviation  is higher 
in  the policy  smoothing  simulation.  Real effective exchange rates  are 
somewhat less variable with smoothing,  but real short—term  interest rates 
are considerably more variable. 
This  simulation illustrates that  smoothing policy instruments may 
lead  to  less,  not more,  smoothness in target variables.  Other variables 
exogenous  to the model are also a source of variation in  output  and 
exchange rates.  The model simulation  suggests  that the random  shocks 
over the historical  period,  including  changes in non—policy  variables 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.—  354 — 
Table  2.  MULTIMOD  Simulations:  ComparIsons  of  HstorIca1.  Policy Stance 
with  Values  of  Endogenous  'la:iables  when Money  Growth,  Tax Rates,  and  the 
Stance  of Gove:mnnent Spending  In  GD? are Smoothed 
Standard  DeviatIons 
Mean Values,  1974—87  1974—87 
Smulated  5jm.ilated 
Variable  Historical  Values under  Historcal  Values under 
Values  SmoothIng  Values 
smoothing 
Growth  rate of real  GOP 
United  States  2.5  2.6  2.8  4.6 
Japan  3.7  3.8  1.8  2.9 
Germany  1.9  2.0  1.9  3.6 
Other Group  of  Seven  2.2  2.4  1.4  3.0 
Rate of inflatIon 
United  States  6.5  7.4  3.0  3.3 
Japan  5.0  6.5  6.0  5.9 
Germany  3.  9  4.5  2.  1  1.9 
Other  Group  of Seven  10.2  11.4  5.4  6.1 
Real  effective  exchange  rate (1980=0) 
UnIted  States  14.6  16.3  12.9  11.7 
Japan  9.4  9.3  5.2  5.1 
Germany  —5.4  —5.1  9.1  8.9 
Other  Group  of Seven  6.6  8.6  3.0  3.1 
Real short—term  Interest  rate 
United  States  2.1  2.5  3.6  .4 
Japan  2.7  2.5  3.5  4.6 
Germany  2.9  2.7  2.4  3,1 
Other  Group  of Seven  2.3  2.4  5.7  6.9 —  36  — 
in exchange rates  and n  economic  activity  than economic  policy  variables. 
The role of policy has been to accommodate  partially  those  shocks.  For 
instance, money  growth  rates were increased initially  after  the first and 
second  oil price  shocks, but a permanent  increase  was reaated.  The basic 
point Ia that the variability  of policy inatrumenta  haa to a large  degree 
been a response  to shocks, rather  than an  exogenous  source  of instability;  72/ 
put in other words,  the hlstorcal period already  contana  considerable 
smoothing——albeit  of a dacretonary  rather  than rule—based  variety——and 
therefore attempts  to impose additional  amoothng on top of it do not 
produce salutary  effects. 
Note  also  that real effective  exchange ratea  take on  values  in this 
simulation  that are very  similar  to the hiatorcal data,  though  they are 
somewhat leas volatile  when policy  is smoothed.  There  seems to be little 
support here for the notion  that exchange  rate stability  can be  achieved 
solely  through  the application  of simple mechanical  of amoothng rules. 
Recall,  however,  that the smoothing  simulation  has only considered  a 
change in the path of policy  variables——leaving  their end pointa 
unchanged——rather  than a permanent  changes in thoae variablea.  A 
permanent  increase  in the rate  of money  growth  or in the shares  of taxes 
or  government  spending n  output  might have  more powerful  effects. 
A  more activist  approach  to the coordination  of economic  policies 
would go beyond  smoothing.  One such  approach  would  be to poatulate  that 
monetary  authorities  reaist movementa  of an intermediate  variable——in 
particular the real  effective exchange  rate——froa their  long—run equilibrium 
levela.  A  system of target zones for exchange rates haa  been proposed —  37  — 
by  WIllIamson  (1983 and 1985), and extended  by WIllIamson  and Miller 
(1987).  The original  proposal calculated  'fundamental  equilIbrium 
exchange  rates,  and advocated  the use of monetary  policies  to resist 
movements  away  from those rates.  As  explaIned  by  WIlliamson  (1983): 
'The basic  focus of exchange rate  management  should  be on  estimatIng 
an approprIate  value  for the exchange  rate and seekIng  to limit 
devIations  from that  value beyond  a reasonable  range  (p.  47)... 
While  other  techniques,  lIke sterilIzed  intervention,  may be able 
to give limIted assIstance,  a serious  commItment  to exchange rate 
management  leaves  no realistic alternative  to a willingness  to 
direct  monetary  polIcy at least in part toward an exchange rate 
target.  (p. 56) 
More recently, Williamson  and Miller  (1987,  p. 7) supplement  the 
prescription  that monetary  policies be used to target real  effective 
exchange  rates with the assignment  of fiscal policies  to targets for the 
growth  in  domestic demand  for the Group of Seven  countries: 
"The basic argument  is that a nominal income  target  fulfills the 
same function  as a money  supply  rule, providing  a "nominal anchor' 
to  prevent  inflation  from taking off and a guide to expectatIons, 
while avoiding  the shocks  to demand  that come from  varIatIons  In 
velocIty...' 
In addition,  the proposal,  or  blueprInt,'  specifies  (p. 2) that: 
"the average level of world  (real) short—term  Interest  rates 
should  be revised up (down)  if aggregated  growth  of  nomInal 
Income  is threatenIng  to exceed  (fall short  of) the sum of 
the target growth  of  nominal  demand  for the participatIng 
countrIes." 
Earlier simulation  studies of target  zones  have been  undertaken  by 
WillIamson  and MIller  (1987,  Appendix C), based  on EdIson  and others  (1987). 
Those  studIes employed  the Federal Reserve Board's  multicountry  model  (MCM), 
which  is characterIzed  by adaptive expectations.  As emphasized  earlier,  in 
simulation  MULTINOD  uses model—consistent  forward—looking  expectations——a —  38  — 
looking expectations——a  difference  that should  produce  different——and  we 
would argue, more firmly grounded——answers. 
Two simulations  were performed——one  for the original  target  zone 
proposal  (labeled "target zones'),  and one for target  zones augmented  by 
a rule for fiscal policy  (labeled  "blueprint").  The attempt was made to 
stay  close  to  the spirit  of the original  proposals  while  still making  a 
few minor modifications. 
Much of  the  action in a  target zone scheme centers  around  the 
monetary reaction function since it is  monetary  policy that is  typically 
assigned to  the exchange rate.  In the standard  version of  MULTINOD,  the 
reaction function  for  short—term  interest rates  involves  reaiating  aovements 
away from an  exogenous  target for  base money.  The  demand for  base  money, 
in  turn, is assumed  to depend  on real GNP and on  its deflator 
with elasticities  close  to unity.  When  the effects of target 
zones are simulated,  this term is retained but with a much lower weight 
than  normal. 73/  The "target—zone'  element in the reaction  function 
is represented by the assumption  that the short—term  interest  rate 
deviates  from  the baseline  depending  on the cube of the deviation  of 
the real effective  exchange  rate  from. its target  value.  74/  Thus,  the 
monetary  policy rule used in both the  target—zone  and blueprint 
simulations  takes the following  algebraic  form: 
(1)  r - rb = f(c-)/nJ + a 
where,  as in Edison  and others  (1987), r is the short—term  rate,  rb is 
its baseline value,  c is the log of the real effective  exchange  rate, c ita 
target  value,  and n is half the width of the target zone,  (namely,  10 —  39  — 
percent);  a is the target  for the monetary  base, a the long—run  demand 
for the monetary  base with  baseline  interest  rates but simulated  output 
and prices, and a is a negative  constant.  75/ 
Targets  for the real  effective  rate were taken  from Williamson 
(1985). 76/  As in Edison  and others  (1987), an  adjustment  to the level 
of the target real effective  rate is made to  keep  it compatible  with the 
definition  used in the model,  but  the constraint  is imposed  that the 
translated  target  exchange  rate variable follow  the same  as in 
Williamson  (1985). 77/ 
As mentioned  earlier,  the  'blueprint  proposes  that fiscal  policy 
follow  a rule targeted on nominal domestic  demand  growth.  As such,  the 
equations  in HL'LTIMOD  for real government  spending  on  goods  and services 
had  to  be endogenized  along such lines.  The target paths  for nominal. 
domestic  demand growth  were  taken  from Williamson  and Miller  (1987) 
for the period  1980—87; outside  that period, we used their formula  to 
calculate  targets. 
The ma±n results  of interest  are portrayed  in Charts 5  to 8,  where 
actual  (historical)  values  are compared  to simulated  values  for the target— 
zone proposal  and for the Blueprint  proposal.  The charts cover real 
effective  exchange  rates, real  GNP growth  rates,  rates of inflation,  and 
current account balances.  Bands  10 percent  each side of WillIamson's 
fundamental  equilibrium  exchange  rates have  been drawn on  Chart  5. 
Several interesting——albeit  tentative——conclusions  emerge from the 
simulations. —  40  — 
First,  there is surprisingly  little  success in  limiting  real exchange 
rate  movements  away from their  targeta, especially  for the United  States. 78/ 
This is apparent  for both the more  limited sssignment  of monetary  policy 
to target  exchange  rates and the case where fiscal policy  is made endogenous, 
though  not specifically  for exchange  rate targeting.  Also,  the cost of 
resisting  exchange  rate in terms of greater variability  of  nominal  interest 
rates appesrs  to be quite high in the model.  In 1985, the short—term 
rate  in the United  States  is 370 basis  points below  its baseline  value 
in the target  zones simulation,  and 260 basis  points  above in  Germany. 
An  attempt  to increase  the feedback onto interest rates of real exchange 
rates produced  explosive  behavior  in the model,  and negative  nominal 
interest  rates.  Why is the movement  in  real effective  exchange rates 
so small?  In  the model,  this is the result  of the long—run  neutrality 
of real variables with respect to monetary  policy, and of the fact 
that monetary  policy  changes are anticipated in advance.  A nominal 
depreciation  resulting  frnm anticipated monetary  expansion  leads quite 
soon to increases  in  import  prices  and domestic inflation,  reducing  the 
amount of  real depreciation.  Such  s scenario has been  discussed  by 
Feldstein  (1987, pp. 11—12) in the following terms: 
a..  if the United  States  had agreed  in 1983  to  the demands of 
the French  and others who wanted  us to stop the dollar's  rise 
[it would  have  come  about  through] easier monetary policy 
[which]  would  have produced inflation  sod  the inflation  would 
have caused  the dollar's  nominal value  to  decline.  In  the  end, 
there would  have been  no  change  in the  real  exchange rate or 
the trade deficit but  a  higher price level  and  s  higher  rate 
of  inflation." —  41  — 
With  perfect foresight  of policy  changes,  the required  movements  in 
monetary  policy may be quite  large for even  small,  and transitory,  real 
exchange  rate changes. It can be seen from Chart  5  that  the dollars 
real effective  exchange rate is judged  by Williamson  and Miller (1987) 
to  be undervalued in 1978—80,  but overvalued  from 1982—85.  Thus,  interest 
rates  have to rise in the earlier  period  but fall in the latter  (relative 
to baseline).  With perfect  foresight,  the amount  they must rise  in the 
earlier period  is amplified  because  it is known  that they  will be lower 
later. 79/  Note that monetary  policy is effective  in the model  in the 
short run, provided  that the money  supply  change  is unanticipated. 
Table  1 indicates  that an increase  in the money supply  of 5  percent 
causes a real effective  depreciation  in the first year ranging from 2 
percent in the case of Germany  to 4 percent in the United  States; by 
the second—year,  the depreciation  has been reduced  to 1 to 2  percent. 
If anticipated  beforehand,  the extent  of the depreciation  is  further 
reduced. 
In future  work, we intend  to relax  the assumption  that the shocks 
of the  l980s——as well as  the  policy  reactions——are  correctly anticipated 
when  the  simulation begins.  Specifically,  we  plan to  do an  experiaent 
where  the values  of exogenous  variables  are projected  using  information 
then available,  and where  in each period a drawing  is made  from the random 
errors  in both policy reaction  functions and in relationships  describing 
private behavior.  Expectations  of future variables  would  thus be 
successively  updated.  This  alternative method  of simulation  is 











































































































































































































































































































































































t—  42  — 
this  alternative  expectations  structure,  which  provides market parti- 
cipants  with less  information  than assumed here,  produces  a signifi— 
candy different  outcome  for exchange  rate behavior  under target zone 
proposals. 
A second  conclusion  is that  the use of monetary  policy alone  to 
maintain  target  zones——keeping  the same stance of fiscal  policy  as in 
the baseline——seems  to exacerbate  the inflationary  pressures  of the late 
1970s and early  1980s, and  to lead to more variable  inflation  rates; see 
Chart  7.  In this simulation,  the United  States  eases monetary  policy  to 
prevent  the dollar's  appreciation  in the 1980—85 period; with  perfect 
foresight  of such a policy  stance, tnflation  rises  somewhat in the late 
1970s  in  anticipation.  Conversely,  the dollar's  undervaluation  in 1987 
(according  to the calcdated fundamental  equilibrium  exchange  rate) 
requires  a tightening  of policy, which  tends  to lower inflation  rates  in 
the mid—1980s  below  baseline  levels. 
The substantial  effects  on real variables  in the blueprint  simulatn 
appear  to be the result mainly  of the fiscal  rule.  In the blueprint 
simulation,  GNP growth is smoothed  considerably  in the United  States  and 
the Federal  Republic  of Germany;  see Chart  6.  The recession  of 1982 and 
the high  growth  of domestic  demand in the United  States  in 1984 are both 
smoothed  out;  U.S. GNP growth  in 1984 is only 2.7 percent, compared  to 
7.2 percent historically,  while  the United  States  no longer  experiences 
a recession  in 1982.  Moderation  of sharp GNP movements  is however not 
so evident  for Japan  and the other Group  of Seven  countries.  Indeed, 
the non—U.S.  Group  of Seven countries  experience  large  output  variations 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































l—  43  — 
mechanical  application  of the Williamson—Miller  formula  for calculating 
nominal  demand  targets; if adjusted  in an ad hoc fashion  (as is done in 
Williamson  and Miller  (1987) for the second  oil shock),  a more  reasonable 
path  might result. 
Third,  current account  imbalances  are reduced  for the major three 
countries  in the blueprInt  simulation,  in the sense of being closer to 
zero;  see Chart 8.  Most of the effects again  come  as a result of the 
changes  in fiscal  stance.  In particular,  targets  for domestic  demand 
growth  in  Germany  and Japan  are consistently  above the historical  values, 
and  this leads  to a much more  stimulative  fiscal  policy in these  countries 
(see  Williamson  and Miller  (1987),  Charts  4 and 5).  But again, there is 
a cost.  General goverrunent fiscal  deficits  reach  10  percent of GNP in 
Germany  and 8 percent  in Japan  in the early  1980s!  By the same  token, 
it is the fiscal stimulus——rather  than the monetary  policy change—— 
that is the cause  of the sizable  appreciation  of the yen and deutsche 
mark in the 1980s  relative  to baseline.  Clearly,  such  large deficits 
would  not be tolerable  politically.  It is also  noteworthy  that the 
counterpart  to the smaller current account  surpluses  in Germany and 
Japan  is larger surpluses  in the other  Group of Seven  countries,  rather 
than a reduction  of  U.S. deficits.  This occurs  because  a weighted  average 
of domestic  demand  targets for France, the United  Kingdom,  Italy and 
Canada  in Williamson  and Miller  (1987) is consistently  lower than 
actual demand  over the period  1974-87. 
In concluding  this discussion,  we reiterate  that  it is important not 
to read too much into these  preliminary  simulation  results—-for  at least 
three reasons. —  44  — 
To begin  with, and harking  back to our earlier discussion  about 
the quality  of coordination,  it would  be inappropriate  to generalize 
about the effecta of more  judgmental  discretionary  approaches  to 
coordination  from  sImulations  of more  mechanical  rule—based  coordI- 
nation  proposals. 
Second, we need to obtain  more information  on the robustness  of 
our preliminary  findings  with respect  to alternative  assumptions 
about the relationship  between  interest  rates  and exchange  rates, 
and to alternative  targets for real  effective  exchange  rates and nomInal 
domestic  demand  growth.  In a similar vein,  it would  be useful to 
employ  MULTIMOD  to draw  out the implications  of alternative 
coordination  proposals  for the developing  countries. 
Finally,  the method  of simulating  alternative  policies  itself 
requires  further  study.  It is sufficient  here  to note  just two of the 
avenues  that might  be explored  in  further  work. 
Instead of  recreating  history  by using the same residuals  as in the 
historical  data,  it could  be revealing  to do many simulations  based  on 
different  drawings from  the distribution of the error  terms present in 
the historical data.  Such repeated  stochastic  simulations avoid  the 
criticism that a policy  rule  may be appropriate  only to a particular 
historical  episode,  rather than to fundamental  features  of the economy. 
A second  avenue is to delve more deeply  into the nature  of policy 
guidelines  and rules, and how these  relate  to historical  experience.  One 
way to  tackle  this problem would be to assume  that  actual  policy over the —  45  — 
historical period  could  be  described  by an  estimated  reaction  function, 
with a systernaric  part  (that  is  a function of  observable  variables)  and a 
random  part.  In one set of simulations,  the systematic  part  of the policy 
rule (i.e.,  the feedback  rule  including  the variables  targeted  and 
their  coefficients)  would be changed  but the random part  would  be left 
unchanged. The argument  here would be that the random  part represents 
either  a component  of discretionary  behavior  or  errors in implementing 
policy, and  that  this random element  would  remain  under all policy regimes. 
In  a  aecond  aet  of simulations,  one would alternatively aaaume  that 
any new policy rule  would be implemented  without error  so that the 
random  part is  identically zero.  The  latter set of simulations could 
be  viewed  aa  too  favorable  to  a  new  policy  rule,  while  the first aet 
would  perhapa not  be  favorable enough.  The  two alternative may  therefore 
give reaaonable  bounda  to  the effects of  new  policies  and  may  help us 
distinguiah  expectatinnal errors from  shocks  to  structural equations. —  46  — 
Footnotes 
1/  This paper  was  presented  st a conference  organized by the  L'ff 
and HWWA—Institut fur Wirtschatsforschung  on "National Economic  Policies 
and Their Impact  on the World Economy" held in Hamburg on May 5—7, 1988. 
In addition to colleagues  in the Research Department,  the authors are 
indebted to  Hali  Edison,  Martin Feldstein,  Pieter Korteweg,  and Jacques 
Melitz for helpful comments  on an earlier draft. 
2/  See the surveys by Artia  and Ostry (1986),  Cooper (1985),  Fischer 
(1987),  Hamada (1979),  Home  and Masson (1988),  Kenen (1987),  Polak (1981) 
and Wallich (1984). 
3/  Evidence  on  the size  of  spillover effects  from  policy actions  by 
the major  industrial  countries  is discussed in the latter part of  this 
section  and in Table  1  of Section  IV. 
4/  The conclusion that  a  monetary expansion under  floating rates affects 
real output in opposite directions at hone  and  abroad  is  associated with 
the Mundell (1971)—Fleming  (1962)  model.  For a recent  evaluation  of 
this  model,  see  Frenkel  and  Razin  (l987a);  a  broader survey of the 
International  transmission mechanism can  be  found  in Frenkel  and  Musaa 
(1985).  Econometric  models  are more  divided  on  whether  a monetary 
expansIon under floating rates  has  negative  transmission effects  on  real 
output abroad;  see  Helliwell and  Padmore  (1985)  and  Bryant  and others 
(1988). 
5/  We  regard the label  as  inappropriate, both because the  proponents 
of decentralized macroeconomic policy—making——including  Corden (1983), 
(1986), Feldatein (1987),  Niehans  (1988),  Stein  (1987),  and  Vaubel 
(1985)——are geographically quite diverse, and because some prominent 
German  economists, such  as  Puehl  (1987),  have  stressed the importance  of  coordination. 
6/  Corden (1986)  has  recently argued  that  there oay  be  a  case fur 
asking  large countries  to  slow  their  speed  of  adjustment to  desired 
policy targets  so  as  to  dampen movements  in real  exchange rates  that 
could  cause  difficulties for  others (see  SectIon IV). 
L  Another constraint on  regional  attempts  to  create more  of  the 
public  good is  that  they  may  divert  or discourage its  production  outside the region;  the argument here is analogous  to  the concepts of 
"trade creation" and "trade  diversion"  In the  customs—union  literature. 
8/  To  reach  this conclusion, It is  necessary  to  assume that  each 
player  does not  have sufficient  polity Instruments  to achieve all  Its 
policy targets  simultaneously, and that coordination  alters  the trade- 
offs  among policy targets;  see Gavin (1986).  Without those  assump— —  47  — 
9/  See  Fischer (1987)  and Frenkel (1983,  1986). 
10/  See Goldstein (1984).  This is not to say that the insulating 
properties of floating rates  are inferior to those  of alternative 
regimes.  Indeed,  it is hard to see any other exchange race regime 
surviving the shocks of the  1970s  without widespread controls  on 
trade and capital. 
11/  On  the possible  use of commodity—price  indicators in the conduct 
of monetary policy,  see  Fieller  (1987). 
12/  See  Bocklemann  (1988)  for a similar conclusion. 
13/  See  Frenkel  (1985). 
14/  Another barrier is disagreement over forecasts  for key economic 
variables over the medium—term; on this point,  see Tanzi (1988). 
15/  See Bryant and others (1988) and Helliwell and Padmore (1985) for a 
comparison of open—economy  multipliers from different  global  econometric 
models.  Frankel and Rockett (1986)  illustrate the sensitivity  of 
welfare effects of coordination  to the selection of the "right"  versus 
the  'wrong"  economic  model. 
16/  See Fischer  (1987).  Dini (1988)  goes further to argue  that when 
the incentives to coordinate  differ  widely among group  members, there 
may be a tendency for bilateral bargains to take place  among those  who 
have the most to trade. 
17/  See  Putnam  and  Bavne  (1984).  At the same time,  the Bonn Summit is 
regarded in some quarters as illustrative  of the pitfalls of coordinating 
macroeconomic policies  when the economic outlook is changing rapidly. 
18/  See Putnam  and Bayne (1984). 
19/  Putnam and Henning (1986). 
20/  Artis and Ostry (1986). 
21/  Feldstein (1988). 
22/  Cooper (1988). 
23/  Another example of high—frequency  coordination is that among central 
banks  of the  largest countries on exchange—market  intervention tactics. 
24/  See  Frenkel and Razjn (1987b). —  48 
— 
25/  For example, the Louvre  Communiqué'  states  that:  "The United States 
'verrnent will pursue policies with a view to reducing the  fiscal 1988 
deficit to 2.3 percent of GNP from its estirmted level  of 3.9  percent in 
fiscal 1987.  For  this purpose, the growth in government  expenditures 
will be held to less than 1 percent in fiscal 1988 as part of the 
contiouing  progrn to reduce the share of government in CNP from its 
current level  of 23 percent;' see  International  t'bnetary Fund (1987). 
26/  Because coordination  of structural policies typically  involves 
Tfferent policy  instruints,  individual country actions cannot—— 
unlike coordination  of fiscal policies——be evaluated  with reference 
to an aggregate policy  indicator that would be desirable  from a 
global perspective. 
27/  This is not to deny the helpful role that  harmonization  of 
i'ructural policies——ranging from adopting similar  tax provisions  to 
implamenting  common regulations concerning movements  of  goods,  labor, 
and  capital——could play in certain  circurmtances. 
28/  Those wi-jo  hold  the view thst  international factors have minimal 
flfluence  on  policy—making, sonetiis also  argue  that countries' 
policy  commiunents in coordination agreents represent  policies 
that would have occurred even in the absence of such agreeitnts. 
Under this  view, coordination affects only the  timing  of policy 
announcernts  with countries  delaying such announcenents  until 
coordination meetings so that they can present a dowry to the 
others. 
29/  See  the  papers  in Buiter and Mareton (1985). 
30/  The classic references to what ie called the '•time  inconsistency" 
of policies are  and Prescott  (1977)  and  Calvo  (1978). 
31/  As Poehl  (1987, pp. 19—20) notes: ".  .  . international  cooperation 
does  not necessarily imply that all parties must agree  on all details at 
all times.  It is important that c  regard it ae a process of  maintaiz.  ing 
stability in our increasingly interrelated rld  economy..  .  The  process 
of  international  cooperation  may  be  difficult  and  burdensome,  even 
frustrating  at  tines,  but there is no alternative  to it." 
32/  It is precisely  because of the risk of '•collusion" among the 
coordinating countries that Vaubel (1985)  favors  decentralized decision 
making. 
33/  See Polak (1981) and Ilenen (1987). 
34/  It is in this context that the probls of time—inconsistency  and 
moral hazard often  surface. —  49  — 
35/  Advocates of rules  also argue that once the public knows better 
what the authorIties  will do,  markets wIll demand less of a risk— 
premium to hold the authorities' financial obligations. 
36/  See Cooper (1982) and U.S.  Congress (1982). 
37/  Goldstein (1980),  (1984),  Frenkel  (1982),  Frenkel and GoldsteIn 
(1986). 
38/  Kenen (1987)  Cites  a regression  of the Change In the inflation rate 
between 1979 and 1985 on the level of the Inflation rate in 1979 and a 
zero—one dummy variable denotIng particIpation in  the exchange rate 
mechanism of  the  EMS.  The sample  was  comprIsed of  22  industrial  coun—  tries.  The  E2-S  dummy variable  was  not statistically signifIcant, 
whereas  the  level of  the inflation  rate in  1979 was.  Note  that  this 
finding  does not  preclude a helpful role of the EMS in disinflation 
since participation could  still have reduced the output cost of 
disinflation (see,  for example,  Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988));  but 
this is a different  story. 
39/  As developed in Polak (1988),  the need for rules to guard against 
the dangers of fine tuning  has receded in any case since economic policy 
in most industrial countries is now  oriented much more toward  the medium— 
term.  Fischer (1987)  makes the  complementary  point that the state of 
our knowledge about the effects of monetary and fiscal policy  is too 
rudimentary to justify policy rules.  Niehans (1988)  expresses doubts 
that rules  could  be relied  upon  to  reduce International disturbances. 
40/  On  the  limitatIons of  purchasing—power  parity rules,  see  Frenkel 
(1981). 
41/  See Frenkel (1975). 
42/  Frenke].  and  Goldstein  (1988). 
43/  The literature on  speculative  attacks" deals with just this 
phenomenon;  see,  for example, Flood  and Garber (1980). 
44/  Tanzi and Ter—Minassian (1987)  and Holtham and others (1987). 
45/  See  Frenkel and Goldstein (1986).  This missing link between 
exchange rate movements and fiscal policy under target zones  is being 
increasingly recognized.  Whereas first—generation  target zone proposals 
spoke only of monetary policy,  second—generation proposals have added 
a policy rule or guideline  for fiscal policy;  contrast Williamson (1985) 
with  Williamson and Miller (1987). -  50  - 
46/  The list of indicators noted in the Comnunique of the Tokyo 
Economic Summit included growth rates of gross national product, 
interest rates, inflation rates, unemployirent rstes, ratios of 
fiscal deficits to GNP, current account  and  trade balances,  money 
growth rates,  international reserve  holdings, and exchange rates. 
47/  There is also the  question of the  proper  assignment  of policy 
instruints  to policy targets.  This issue is touched on in the next 
section. 
48/  See Tanzi (1988) 
49/  See Mussa (1981) and the Jurgensen Report (1983). 
50/  This characterization  is not 'miversally  shared.  Willinson and 
Miller (1987),  for  example, regard the gold standard and Bretton Woods 
as more symmetric  systems. 
51/  See Frenkel and  Goldstein (1988). 
52/  See Ciavazzi and Giovannini (1986). 
53/  In practice, high—inflation countries have sometimes resorted to 
capital controls during exchange rate crises so as to avoid  the  choice 
of having to give up either  monetary independence or the exchange rate 
target. 
54/  To the extent that the EMS produces greater stability  and pre- 
dictability of exchange rates, all members also share any efficiency 
gains associated  with moving closer  to a single currency. 
55/  Eichengreen (1987). 
56/  See  Gornbusch  (1988). 
57/  Holthem and others (1987).  See  the proposals on the EMS put forward 
to the European Commimity tbnetary Committee  last Fall by Minister Balladur 
of France as prefacing  such a symmetric  development of the EMS. 
58/  See Oudiz and Sachs  (1984),  McKibbin and  Sachs (1988),  and Taylor 
(1985) for  evidence on the  isze of the gains and Frankel  and Rockett 
(1986) for the effects of using the "wrong" model. 
59/  See Schultze (1987) and Bryant and others (1988).  As an example 
of the difficulties associated with identifying the "coimterfactual" 
contrasst Feldstein's  (1987)  appraisal  of  the likaly  evaluation  of 
exchange  rates in  the  absence  of the Plaza Agreenent  with  that  of 
Lemfalussy (1987). —  51  - 
60/  See Chosh and Masson (1988). 
61/  See Williamson (1985) and Williamson and  Miller (1987). 
62/  Another recent  paper,  Taylor (1986),  considers  different exchange 
rate arrangements  in a rational expectations  model; however, only 
completely fixed  and freely floating  exchange rates are compared, and 
the model is limited to the seven major industrial  countries. 
63/  The model simulations  do not, however,  allow for  two other ways in 
which private sector behavior may be affected by changes in policy regimes 
First, the variance of output,  prices,  or exchange rates may be different, 
leading to different degrees of substitutability  among goods or assets. 
For example,  it has been argued that the greater variability  of exchange 
rates has led to a lower level  of international  trade  than  would have 
prevailed under  fixed  rates.  Second,  expectations  may contain "speculativ 
bubbles in some circumstances,  and hence  may not solely reflect economic 
fundamentals.  For example, the  rise  of the  1J.S. dollar early in 1985 
despite declining interest rate differentials in favor of dollar— 
denominated  assets is hard to explain. 
64/  See Masson and others (1988). 
65/  In contrast to the industrial countries,  developing countries are 
not assumed to face perfect capital markets,  Instead, the availability 
of financing  reflects their  ability to service  debt,  as measured by a 
ratio of their inflation—adjusted  interest payments to the value of their 
exports.  It is assumed that there  is an uppor limit to this ratio, 
beyond which the risk of nonrepayment becomes  high,  and consequently 
creditors would refuse to grant further new lending.  As a result of 
the financing constraint, imports by developing countries are also con- 
strained, tending to reduce both consumption  and  investment.  The con- 
straint on financing is,  however, not solely  based on current developments 
but also reflects an assessment of future  export prospects of developing 
countries; expected future exports are made to be consistent  with the 
model's solution for  those future exports. 
66/  This is a feature that will be relaxed in future  work——in 
particular,  by mposng shocks to residuals in successive periods. 
67/  Labor  markets do not appear explicitly in the model, but features 
of wage bargaining,  such as those due  to overlapping  multiperiod contracts 
are reflected in the  equation estimated for inflation. 
68/  One strong implication  of  this  empirical  regularity is that  any 
"assignment rule"  that assigns monetary policy  to the  current account—— 
for example,  Williamson and  Miller's  (1987)  Blueprint——is  going to face 
problems;  on  this point,  see  Genberg  and  Swoboda  (1987)  and Boughton 
(1988). —  52  — 
69/  It is assumed here that fiscal expansion is not accommodated by an 
increase in money growth.  Current account effects also reflect the impact 
of interest rate changes on net investment  income. 
70/  Niehans (1988,  p. 215) also  stresses the importance  of steady 
policies:  The first,  and most promising,  step to reducing international 
disturbances must surely  be the avoidance of the policy shifts  that 
produce them.  Especially for the dominant economy, the United States, 
the most important part of cooperation  is steadiness." 
71/  The measure of real effective exchange rate is the  country's  manu- 
factured export  price, divided by a weighted average export price  of its 
competitors, including developing  countries.  Thus,  an increase indicates 
appreciation. 
72/  Corden (1986,  p. 431)  recognizes  this to some extent:  "[Coordinationi 
means, incidentally, that if private  investment in a country declines 
there should be some compensating increase in its fiscal deficit to modify 
the  current account  effect.  It does not necessarily  mean that a fiscal 
policy stance should  be stable." 
73/  The role of this variable is to give a nominal anchor to the system. 
The inclusion of this term is also consistent  with the intent  of the 
blueprint proposal to make the level of interest rates  depend (in an 
unspecified  fashion) on the growth of aggregate  UN?. 
74/  Edison and others (1987,  p. 97). 
75/  In implementing  the  rule,  the value given by Edison and others 
t1987) to n,  10 percent, was  initially tried,  but the model either would 
not solve or gave negative nominal interest rates.  Consequently  a higher 
value, 20 percent, waa used,  implying a lower feedback of exchange rate 
miaalignmenta on interest rates. 
76/  Again,  we adopt  Williamson's (1985) estimates  of target  or equilibrium 
real effective exchange rates merely to stay as close as possible to the 
original proposals.  There should be no implication that  we agree or 
disagree with those  estimates. 
77/  It should also be noted that  MULTIMOO's definition of real effective 
exchange rates is wider than  moat measures, since it allows for competition 
from manufacturea produced in developing countries. 
78/  It is also the  case in Edaon and others (1987),  that real exchange 
rates undera target  zone regime  differ little  from their hiatorical 
values. —  53  — 
79/  Suppose there  are three time  periods,  and that interest parity 
relates interest rates  and exchange rates.  Suppose also that the exchange 
rate is unchanged  in the  third  period.  In each period,  the nte:est rare 
differential is equal to the appreciation  that  is expected (and actually 
occurs) next period.  Thus,  tn terms  of deviations from baseline, 
dt = et+1 
— et,  where e3  0.  Then in the second period,  the interest 
differential will have to be equal to the desired change  in the exchange 
rate;  if it is overvalued by 5  percent,  interest rates  will have to be 
5  percentage points lower,  If  in the first period the exchange rate is 
undervalued by 5 percent, then interest rates  will  have to be not 5,  but 
10 percentage points,  higher. —  54  — 
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